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Abstract
The paper examines Amartya Sen’s seminal work Development and Freedom
(1999) in relation to his underlying conception of justice and particularly in relation
to the tension that arises in the correlation between basic freedom and basic goods.
The idea is to address the question as to which of the two elements (basic goods or
basic freedoms) takes precedence to the enactment of global justice. The paper
advances a particular distinction between a foundational approach and a functional
approach when addressing the question of the priority and primacy of any of the two
elements and sheds light on a contentious answer, namely, that basic goods are foun-
dationally primary in relation to basic freedoms and that such a primacy does not
rule out the functional priority of basic freedoms.
Keywords: Freedom, development, social justice, global justice, basic goods,
priority problem.
Introduction
One of the most important challenges to any theory of global justice is not so
much about the inclusion of the value of freedom alongside the concern about the
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material conditions for everybody to lead a dignified life plan (basic goods), but
about the tension that arises in the correlation between basic freedoms and basic
goods and the question about interconnectedness that is being posed by the com-
plexity of this interaction. This complex correlation may be best observed in the
relationship between freedom and development, as instructively set out by Amartya
Sen in his seminal work Development and Freedom (1999).
It is my contention that it is not enough to say that basic goods and basic free-
doms constitute the whole of global justice without accounting for the tensions and
conflicts that arise in such a composition. Correlatively, it is also pertinent in my
opinion to critically address the common tendency of looking at a sort of political-
institutional and logical primacy of political freedoms in the form of political (neg-
ative) rights in detriment to social (positive) rights. With all of this in mind, the
paper inspects the combination of basic goods and basic freedoms that serves as the
basis to defending the idea of global justice (particularly the contentious idea that
the best approach to global justice comes down to a defence of the fundamental
demand of reaching what I have called the sufficiency threshold).
In drawing on Amartya Sen’s seminal work Development and Freedom (1999),
this paper argues for (a) the primacy of basic rights along the lines of a functional-
differentiation approach and (b) for the primacy of basic goods along the lines of a
foundational-differentiation approach. In other words, to the question as to which
of the two elements (basic goods or basic freedoms) takes precedence to the enact-
ment of social justice, the proposed answer defends the priority of basic freedoms
over basic goods. And to the question as to which of those elements provides the
foundations to which, the proposed answer defends the claim that basic goods are
foundationally primary in relation to basic freedoms and that such a primacy does
not rule out the functional primacy of basic freedoms. The focus of the paper, how-
ever, is not so much on the proposed answers, but rather on the distinctions at hand.
The idea is to see whether such a notional framework is sound, useful and coherent
to account for the interconnectedness of basic goods and basic freedoms. 
The paper is organized as follows. Part I provides a general description of the
idea of global justice that is at the background of our concern about the seriality or
lexicality order of basic goods and basic freedoms. Part II addresses the basic dis-
tinctions between a functional and foundational approach to basic goods in order to
examine the thesis of the primacy of basic goods over basic freedoms. Part III
focuses attention on the reach and scope of the aforementioned distinctions and
judges them against the background of Sen’s thesis of development as freedom.
This part explores Sen’s claims about the instrumental and constructive role of free-
dom, and most importantly, his central claim that freedom is the primary end and
the principal means of development. Here the paper states the view of the priority
of basic freedoms in functional terms and the correlative (non-contradictory) view
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of the primacy of basic goods in foundational terms. Part IV concludes the paper by
drawing attention to how strong can the thesis of the primacy of basic goods over
basic freedoms be (the concreteness of the former, the relative flexibility of the lat-
ter) and by highlighting both the distinctiveness and the interconnectedness of basic
goods and basic freedoms. 
I
Before moving on, some clarifications regarding the idea of global justice are in
order. This is because such a notion constitutes the framework in which the tension
between basic goods and basic freedoms will be examined.
Notice, for a start, that it is not clear today what a theory of global justice should
be like. A great number of political philosophers and social scientists are repeated-
ly drawing attention to the fact that theories of global justice are in their infancy.
Charles Beitz, one of the proactive voices in the debate, recalls this fact and stress-
es the importance of working out a clearer and effective political and intellectual
framework for this pressing matter. Beitz asserts that “[…] at first glance, it is not
clear that there is any subject for global political justice to be about. And even if one
discerns a subject, it is not clear how to proceed…” and later he adds “[…] I do not
believe there is any more urgent preoccupation for political philosophy today than
to work out a better theoretical understanding of these matters of global justice.”
(2005: 25-27). Thomas Nagel also points to the incipient status of global justice and
the moral and political importance of engaging in such a debate. “[…] Concepts and
theories of global justice” Nagel asserts “are in the early stages of formation and it
is not clear what the main questions are, let alone the main possible answers” (2005:
113). Other prominent contemporary philosophers such as Leif Wenar have sug-
gested that global justice is indeed a “nascent academic sub-discipline” (Wenar,
2007: 106).
As we can infer from the aforementioned remarks, it is not the main objective
of this paper to offer a particular theory of global justice, and therefore I will not try
an independent argument in this regard. It suffices to point out to what can be con-
sidered the fundamental demand for global justice: the requirement to ensure that
everybody has enough to lead a dignified life, (that is, enough to meet what I called
elsewhere the sufficiency threshold). It is my contention that the best approach to
global justice comes down to a defence of this fundamental demand–a demand that
may well be seen as commonsensical or not particularly over-demanding at the
national level.
Global justice entails not only ‘basic goods as such’, to use a simple expression,
but also a qualitative dimension in basic goods. If we talk about global justice sole-
ly in terms of basic goods, then there is the danger of missing the fact that goods in
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themselves (if there are truly such things) are nothing but elements that create a con-
dition of life. Similarly, if we talk about global justice solely in terms of a standard,
it becomes a too loose and ambiguous approach: only when a standard contains a
strict account of the goods does it have a reasonably objective meaning. A convinc-
ing approach to global justice should thus be the combination of these two elements
(Sen’s capability approach is very instructive in this sense and appropriate as a the-
oretical framework for global justice)1.
The idea of global justice is also related to this very topical debate: the cos-
mopolitanism/anti-cosmopolitanism debate. As a matter of background, it is worth
to notice the sense in which cosmopolitanism should be understood.
Cosmopolitanism is the name of an emerging theoretical approach to moral and
political issues that seems to go beyond the realms of nation-states and the realm of
state-system based international relations. Thus far, cosmopolitanism is subdivided
into two categories, with most philosophers and political theorists distinguishing
between moral and political-institutional cosmopolitanism (Beitz, 1999: 298;
Pogge, 2002: 170). 
This distinction is already a central aspect of the global social justice debate.
Moral cosmopolitanism, as David Miller points out, “says simply that human
beings are all subject to the same set of moral laws” (Miller, 2007: 24). In other
words, moral cosmopolitans are those who hold the view that, as Simon Caney puts
it, “there is no morally fundamental significant difference between the domestic and
the global realms” (Caney, 2005: 265)2. Political-institutional cosmopolitanism, on
the other hand, is commonly related to questions concerning the system of institu-
tions that shape our collective existence. The debate about global justice and cos-
mopolitanism that is in the background of this paper strictly evokes political-insti-
tutional cosmopolitanism.
II
Having said all this let me address the particular issue at hand. It seems accu-
rate to claim that basic freedoms should be thought of as necessary conditions
(though not sufficient) for accessing basic goods and vice versa. This is the inter-
connectedness claim.
One might want to argue that basic freedoms are a constitutive part of subsis-
tence or that they are absolutely indistinguishable from subsistence. This may be
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1 See Amartya Sen’s recent work The idea of Justice (2009).
2 Thomas Nagel also identifies cosmopolitanism with a moral approach that he calls monism, follow-
ing Liam Murphy’s terminology used in “Institutions and the Demands of Justice” (1998). See Nagel
2005: 122-123.
called the co-substantiality approach. On this approach, the relationship between
basic goods and basic freedoms is of little importance since, for instance, basic free-
doms would be assumed simply as substantive goods absolutely equivalent to basic
(subsistence) goods.
Without going into the details regarding the possible objections to this approach
at this point, it seems to me that its simplicity is of a negative kind. It has the ten-
dency to overlook the specificity of basic goods and basic freedoms when the ques-
tion of priority arises, having thus a potentially negative effect both on the under-
standing and undertaking of fairer public policies. The co-substantiality approach is
also too weak an account of the theoretical difficulties surrounding the themes of
domestic and global social justice.
The evident alternative is to claim that basic freedoms and basic goods are dis-
tinctive categories. Let me call this the differential approach. This approach is
twofold: basic goods and basic freedoms are differentiable in their functional and
foundational features. Each of these two variants of the differential approach poses
a particular form of interconnection between basic goods and basic freedoms.
The dispute along the lines of the functional difference relates to the issue of
priority. It is about the question as to which of the two elements (basic goods or
basic freedoms) takes precedence to the enactment of global justice. There are obvi-
ously three possibilities here: (a) the priority of basic goods over basic freedoms,
(b) the priority of basic freedoms over basic goods, and (c) the non-priority possi-
bility (i.e., both elements go hand in hand). 
The second dispute concerning the foundational difference is set out in terms of
the grounding value rather than in terms of enactment. This variant asks the ques-
tion as to which of those elements provides the foundations to which. There are two
options here: either basic goods (needs) are primary in relation to basic freedoms or
the opposite (a third possibility here would be to assume the inapplicability of the
problem but this might be too much of an easy way out. It amounts to the co-sub-
stantiality thesis). In what follows I intend to shed light on the pertinence of the dis-
tinctions above and propose some answers to these questions. 
III
As just mentioned, Amartya Sen (1999) provides a very suggestive analysis of
the relationship between development and freedom that helps bringing to light the
above alternatives, thus contributing to the aim of providing a more comprehensive
account global justice in line of the sufficiency threshold claim. I shall draw on his
views to this effect. 
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Consider firstly some preliminary remarks. Sen’s general view of social justice
in terms of capabilities (or substantive freedoms to function as fully-fledged human
beings) exhibits to a great extent the rationale of the sufficiency threshold thesis
mentioned earlier. The capability approach is not about defending what people have
in a fetishist fashion: it is not about the means of living as if that was all that mat-
ters to tackle poverty and injustice (it is not strictly a metric of equality and justice)3.
I adopt Sen’s idea of the importance of functioning and capabilities as opposed to
the sometimes overemphasised ‘commodity views’ in the pursuit of justice.
Sen provides a robust account of freedom as development that rightly shows the
importance of scrutinizing any development policy not only in terms of economic
measures (purely financial calculations) but in terms of human development. It is
about aiming at the well-being of individuals rather than the economy. Sen thus
claims that we should broaden our analysis (and demands) from the basic idea of
“means of living” to the “actual living”, to “the freedom to achieve actual livings
that one can have reason to value (Sen, 1999: 72-73)”4. This broadening is reflect-
ed in his assessment of (human) development as (substantive) freedom. For him,
development (we might say here justice) is seen as “a process of expanding substan-
tive freedoms that people enjoy”, which firstly, but not uniquely, must start with the
overcoming of systematic material deprivation (Ibid: 3). 
This is a convincing stance that is both theoretically informed and suggestive as
an instrument for public policy and institutional design (as discussed in the final
chapters of this study). In including basic freedoms as part of the bundle of basic
goods that the claims for global justice enclose, I am sharing the spirit of such views
and some of its salient corollaries. Claiming for global justice is not defending the
conventional wisdom in regard to basic goods as simply means for subsistence or
of a transitory remedy against injustice –commonly seen in paternalistic (assis-
tance-like) public policies around the world. By contrast, securing basic goods
together with basic freedoms (the sufficiency threshold) should be seen as the heart
of the demands for global justice, demands that call upon the negation of systemic
deprivation5.
Having said this let me now focus attention on the aforementioned differential
approach and judge it against the background of Sen’s thesis of development and
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3 See Sen’s “Equality of What” (1979) and the vast literature that followed in relation to the currency
and metric of equality. 
4 Sen submits that Rawls’s idea of primary goods goes beyond the simplistic emphasis on income, but
he also maintains that Rawls’s view is still limited insofar as it is still a sort of ‘resourcist’ account (to
the extent of which it emphasises the idea of ‘means’ in defining primary goods as “general purpose
means”). I disagree with this interpretation. I think Rawls’ account (and his idea of ‘means’) is richer
than Sen’s takes it to be, but I am not pursuing this matter here.
5 For a detailed defence of the rationale of the sufficiency threshold in connection with systemic dep-
rivation, see the coming chapter, section II.
freedom. To do this, I need to qualify those two categories (development and free-
dom). As hinted above, development and freedom can be thought of in a wider
sense, i.e., in the wider sense of substantive freedom and human development (as
Sen does) and in narrow sense, i.e., development according to the development
index (in terms of nutrition, infant mortality, access to health, education, decent
housing, etc.) and freedom as political participation, free press, transparency, and
accountability. As already mentioned, I am sympathetic to Sen’s wider account.
However, I think that his general account is in some ways too close to the co-sub-
stantiality approach. In trying to address the differential approach, I am also trying
to move from the wide to the narrow version of development and freedom. This is
more compatible with the ‘minimalistic’ variables necessary to account for the
demands of global justice –the variables being basic goods and basic freedoms, the
demand: to ensure that everybody has enough to lead a dignified life. In this direc-
tion, development stands for subsistence goods and freedom for political rights
stricto sensu.
So therefore, my interpretative proposal stresses the specificity of basic goods
and basic freedoms and thus raises the question of priority and primacy of any of
the two different variables in question (this is against the co-substantiality approach
mentioned earlier in the paper and in view of the particularly relevant task of mak-
ing sense of the idea of global justice). Let us go on to see the details of the differ-
ence and connectivity of basic goods and basic freedoms in the light of Sen’s cen-
tral idea of Development as Freedom.
Sen’s central claim is that freedom is “the primary end and the principal means
of development” (Sen, 1999: 36). The primacy (Sen also uses the term pre-emi-
nence) of freedom is argued for in a set of three arguments:
1) its direct importance in human living associated with basic capabilities
(including that of political and social participation);
2) its instrumental role in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing
and supporting their claims to political attention (including the claims of eco-
nomic needs);
3) its constructive role in the conceptualization of ‘needs’ (including the under-
standing of ‘economic needs’ in a social context) (Ibid: 148).
It seems to me that the arguments (2) and (3) for the primacy of freedom, as they
stand, can be understood along the lines of the functional approach; and these argu-
ments, as discussed below, are mostly pointing towards the second alternative in the
functional approach, i.e., the priority of freedom (rather than towards the opposite)6.
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6 This is a general approach to the question. This position does not bar us from supporting the non-pri-
ority thesis once we move from this level of abstraction to the concrete level of contextualized insti-
tutional practices.
From a technical point of view (which mostly targets the orthodox views of
development in economics), the priority of freedom is concerned with democratic
debate and decision-making made through public choice and should come first as a
matter of efficiency and plausibility. Free exchange of views and opinion in the pub-
lic space is the key to development and, by opposition, the lack of freedom would
make any public policy for development a recipe for failure, in spite of the accura-
cy of the economic procedures7. Expert calculations alone, however brilliant, can
hardly work towards the desired ends of global justice, i.e. the eradication of pover-
ty (or in the language of Sen, the eradication of capability deprivation). We need to
bring forward “the understanding of economic needs in a social context” and the
public “conceptualization of needs” that arises out of substantive political freedoms
as the primary means for development and social justice (Ibid: 148). This is why
development as freedom as examined in Sen’s work is set out as a petition for a
more robust approach to developmental polices that go beyond the question of
resources and pure economic welfare. Such policies should be set out with consid-
eration to the priority of freedom.
From the political-institutional (historical) point of view, the priority of freedom
is expressed in Sen’s well-known empirical claim that large-scale famines do not
happen in a democracy: “no substantial famines have ever occurred in any inde-
pendent country with a democratic from of government and a relatively free press”
(Ibid: 152)8. In looking after the political freedoms and the protection of civic free-
doms, a democratic regime will provide the security and the necessary pre-emptive
measures to tackle absolute deprivation. This does not happen, Sen argues, in
authoritarian regimes (Ibid: 16). Again, the functionally primary character of polit-
ical freedom seems socially warranted (as they “induce social responses to econom-
ic needs”) and epistemologically empowering, i.e., “central to the conceptualization
of economic needs” (Ibid: 154, my emphasis). Freedom is therefore a pre-condition
of economic growth (narrow view of basic goods) and human development (wider
view of basic goods).
What about Sen’s argument (1)? Compared to the other two arguments, this one
is clearly harder to grasp. Sen does not give us a detailed characterization of the
argument. We then need to provide some extra considerations9. The argument, to
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7 Sen provides relevant public policy insights to illustrate his claims. For instance, in relation to devel-
opment related to reducing infant mortality, he suggests that public policies should empower women
through literacy and employment as a matter of efficacy in this area –let alone as a matter of human-
ity or proper political morality (see chapter 8 of Sen’s Development as Freedom).
8 Sen offered a detailed analysis of this topic in Poverty and Famines (1981).
9 Sen dedicates one paragraph to this argument (p. 152). The problem seems to be that Sen ‘hesitates’
between the idea of the pre-eminence of political freedoms (his argument here) and the alternative the-
sis of co-substantiality. In this paragraph, he seems to be defending basic freedoms as part of basic
capabilities (“the importance of political freedoms as part of basic capabilities has already been dis-
recall, is that political freedoms are primordial in virtue of the “direct importance in
human living associated with basic capabilities (including that of political and
social participation)” (Ibid, 148). Notice that Sen also uses the more familiar notion
(in the family of moral and political philosophy) of intrinsic value as synonymous
with “direct importance”10. Unsurprisingly, argument (1) is particularly related to
the foundational approach and certainly more open-ended precisely because it has
to do with such a controversial ‘property of intrinsicness’.
Understood in plain terms, the claim that freedoms have intrinsic value is not
mysterious. It is simply (and significantly) asserting that every type of freedom
–freedom of political participation, freedom of dissent, etc.– is valuable in itself11.
What is more, it does not seem odd to think, the way Sen presents it, that those free-
doms are both a basic constituent of development as well as an instrument for devel-
opment (an enabling condition). This is what the interconnectedness claim reflects
and what a convincing conception of global justice is supposed to embrace. 
However, there is a more subtle sense in which the property of intrinsicness may
be approached. This happens when we relate the question of intrinsicness (as non-
derivative) to the questions concerning foundations. It is the question as to which of
the two elements in correlation constitutes the grounds of social justice. In this case
the elements are development and freedom in a general sense and basic goods and
basic rights more specifically. 
Again, it might be argued that we should drop this opposition and adjudicate a
constitutive (non-derivative) value to both basic goods and basic freedoms in rela-
tion to social justice; or that we should simply disregard the question concerning
constitutive elements. I think that such an option is unsatisfactory. The best option
is to engage with this question to further clarify the lines of the debate and the con-
testing view points therein. Here is where the division of labour between the foun-
dational and the functional approach become useful. 
In relation to Sen’s three claims stated above, the trick is to establish that claims
(2) and (3) are particularly about a functional differentiation between basic free-
doms and basic goods (and only indirectly may be used to address the foundation-
al question). By contrast, claim (1) is particularly about a foundational differentia-
tion that cannot be put on a par with the question relating to function. In this way,
we may avoid the possible contradiction between the instrumental value of freedom
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cuss in the earlier chapter”, Sen says in this same paragraph.). I want to leave aside this ambiguity and
take Sen’s view as a defence of the logical and social primacy of ‘political’ freedoms, as the book
implicitly suggests (especially chapters 1, 3 and 6). 
10 In fact, Sen uses this term in the chapter ‘Culture and Human Rights’, in a concluding remark. He
says: “The case for basic freedoms and for the associated formulations in terms of rights rests on: 1)
their intrinsic value, 2) their consequential role […] 3) their constructive role […]” (Sen, 1999: 246).
11 An example of this rather general claim is this: while education is valued originally for its contribu-
tion to job-seeking, over time it comes to be valued for itself.
as stated in (2) and (3) and the intrinsic value of freedom as stated in (1). What is
more, we ca also bring to the fore a clearer division of labour between basic goods
and basic freedoms, thus facilitating a more convincing answer to the priority prob-
lem in this matter.
Once we distinguish these two types of questions and put together basic goods
and basic freedoms along the lines of the functional approach, we may try to answer
the question just mentioned: which of the two, basic goods or basic freedoms, is pri-
mary? In my interpretation of Sen’s Development as Freedom, the answer seems
ambiguous. We may be fairly sure that freedom is functionally primary. However,
in foundational terms, the primacy of freedom over basic goods (or vice versa) is
not so clear. Certainly the foundation of freedom and development is constituted by
every particular human being as free agents; free agents are the “constitutive part”
of freedom and development (Ibid: 4). However, this assertion, as important as it is,
does not solve the question concerning the interaction of development and freedom,
in the relationship between basic goods and basic rights.
Sen seems to be more inclined to the view that development (in the narrow
sense) is primary in relation to freedom (also in the narrow sense). For a start, the
consequential and constructive role of freedom (claims (2) and (3)) seem to point
towards the primacy of basic goods. These second and third considerations (the
instrumental and constructive roles of political freedoms) evidently serve the pur-
pose of basic goods (satisfying basic needs) as Sen’s very own phrasing shows.
Basic freedoms are relevant to the extent that they give people the ‘voice’ to claim
for economic needs (basic goods) and help in the crucial task of conceptualizing
needs (Ibid: 148). The satisfaction of basic needs is one of the consequences of hav-
ing in place (or shaping) effective and legitimate political-institutional structures
protecting and securing the goods and rights we require for enacting global jus-
tice12. Evidently, in line with this interpretation, Sen’s Development as Freedom
may be assumed as one valuable philosophical (and political-economic) view from
which some of the relevant features of the idea of global justice as reaching the suf-
ficiency threshold can be found.
In commenting on Rawls’s lexically prior liberty principle in the third chapter
of his book (‘Freedom and the Foundations of Justice’), Sen recognizes the compar-
atively “moderate” formulation of such a principle as opposed to the more extreme
approach of Nozick whereby the precedence of the political over “the pursuit of
social goals” is uncompromisingly advocated (1999, 63). I agree with Sen’s read-
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12 Considering the distinctive notions of development and freedom, particularly in the narrow sense
(subsistence goods and political-institutional freedom respectively), one may rather change the phrase
‘development as freedom’ (and the implication of freedom as absolutely primary) with ‘development
in freedom’. Among the advantages of the latter formulation is that such a statement not only is less
demanding, but also may better reflect the demands of social justice as ST.
ing of Rawls in this respect and I think we can take the same criterion to interpret
Sen’s thesis of the primacy of (political) freedoms from the standpoint of the foun-
dational approach. Basic freedoms should not be seen as preceding basic goods but
as sanctioning those basic goods (the satisfaction of basic needs). Stating Sen’s
claim in the comparatively moderate fashion as hinted above gives weight to his
own valid concerns about the ‘economisation’ of the notion of development and, at
the same time, gives room to a more balanced account of the interconnectedness of
freedoms and goods. 
This more balanced account can also be seen in Sen’s recent work The Idea of
Justice (2009), particularly in his critique of Rawls’s “transcendental institutional-
ism”. In contrast to his comparative approach, Sen discusses the problems of feasi-
bility and redundancy of any transcendental solution to the problem of justice, and
points towards the flaws of an “arranged-focused view of justice” as opposed to “a
realization-focused understanding of justice” (2009: 9-10). This difference in per-
spective (being the second perspective one of the main features of Sen’s capabili-
ties’ approach) reveals by itself the likelihood of my interpretation of the function-
al priority of freedom and confirms the distance Sen takes from Nozick’s extreme
formulation of the priority of Rawls’s liberty principle or the idea of the absolute
priority of the liberty principle. As he puts it: “Giving a special place –a general pre-
eminence– to liberty goes well beyond taking note of the importance of liberty as
one of many influences on a person’s overall advantage. Liberty is indeed useful,
like income and other primary goods, but that is not all that is involved in the impor-
tance of liberty… (Sen, 2009: 299)” 
IV
Evidently, the above interpretation of Sen’s ordering of freedoms and basic
goods ‘to be able to do and be what ‘every one has reason to value’ ’ –or that which
Rawls called “primary goods” as ‘all purpose means’ to advance people’s ends– is
closely related to the contesting claim of the foundational primacy of basic goods
over basic freedoms I am trying to point at. 
Theoretically, form the standpoint of Rawls’s theory of justice, this claim is
warranted on his own thesis of the lexically prior basic goods principle found in
Political Liberalism (1996), where Rawls recognizes the primordial character of
basic goods in virtue of their role as a crucial medium for social relations (basic
goods as primary even in relation to his two principles of justice). 
From the standpoint of Sen’s work, as already argued, this claim of the prima-
cy of basic goods is warranted on the interpretation that I have already suggested,
namely that freedoms are functionally prior to basic goods –which means that free-
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doms are to be defended in pursue of people’s well-being; and correlatively, that
basic goods are at the basis of any defence of the idea of freedom.
This paper has intended to offer a particular setting whereby one may defend the
view that basic goods are primary in relation to basic freedoms. Admittedly, the
idea of primacy (or even the image of grounding) can be improved. We might say
that basic freedoms are anchored in basic goods. The allegorical term anchoring
may well best capture both distinctiveness and interconnectedness between basic
goods and basic freedoms. In any case, this position reflects the particular steadi-
ness (or concreteness) of basic goods in comparison to the relative flexibility of
basic freedoms. Basic freedoms involve a larger variety of factors ranging from
those implied in the comprehensive category of the good to very particular events
in the current history of each society. 
This is not necessarily the case with basic goods (especially in the form of sub-
sistence goods). All things considered and leaving aside the cases where someone
decides to undertake a hunger strike to protest for certain causes –which may
include the cause of providing basic goods for those who most need them–, we
might allow constraining our basic freedoms under some very special circum-
stances, but we should not disregard our most basic needs. Sen has very recently
made this point by posing the following question: “Why must any violation of lib-
erty, significant as it is, invariably be judged to be more crucial for a person –or for
a society– than suffering from intense hunger, starvation, epidemic and other
calamities? (my emphasis Sen, 2009: 300). 
The intuitive force of such a claim can be set out in more analytical terms pre-
cisely by introducing the foundationally primacy of basic goods and the functional
value of basic freedoms. The point can easily be observed also in virtue of the very
‘nature’ of basic goods. Basic goods are more firm, permanent or constant, and
objective (even if not absolutely objective); they are “biological-cum-social” con-
ditions of existence, the universal conditions to secure that everybody can exercise
what Miller calls “core human activities” (Miller, 2007, 184).
If one thinks of a situation (social, not individual) where a government has to
sacrifice either subsistence or freedom, one can image the possibility (moral-polit-
ical admissibility) of sacrificing the latter but not the former13. We should choose
the restrictions of our freedoms for the sake of our own subsistence. Here subsis-
tence may well be interchangeable with security, which seems to be the primary
responsibility of any state towards its constituents. Bernard Williams asserts in
Hobbesian spirit that the first task of the state (the political) is that of securing order,
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13 An opposing view is sometimes held in situations of war where one ideal (let’s call it freedom) is
hold even in spite of the very possibility of dying. In these cases, some collectives might choose to
disappear rather than surrender. I do not discuss the issue here. It suffices to say that this extreme pos-
sibility does not defeat the point (exceptional cases reinforce the general rule).
protection and safety (Williams, 2005: 3) and that this fundamental ‘nature’ of the
political responds to the preponderance of security over freedoms in those very
extreme situations. The claims for global justice are supposed to account for (or be
compatible with) this primordial alternative.  
Again, the relationship between basic goods and basic freedoms is admittedly
tensional and it is true that conflicts between basic goods and basic freedom appear.
However, it is also true that, as Miller says, there is “no across-the-board incompat-
ibility between asserting a human right to food and asserting a human right to free-
dom” (Miller, 2007: 189). Actual conflicts arising between these types of basic
rights and the possible resolutions we might find say more about conciliatory alter-
natives between competing claims in very concrete cases and circumstances than
that which any strict theory of rights can say by virtue of an alleged absolute value
given to either type of rights. 
Evidently, these issues are complex and should be treated in a separate paper. At
this point the idea has been to make a case for the interconnectedness of basic goods
and basic freedoms in a way that explains both interdependency and the primacy of
basic goods, which characterizes the particular idea of global justice in the form of
a sufficiency threshold demand14.
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